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Konstantinos Eleftheriou;y and Nickolas J. Michelacakis
Abstract
We consider a vertically structured market with two retail rms of mixed ownership
competing against each other exercising spatial price discrimination. We examine the
strategic behavior of downstream rivals as well as the e¤ect of privatization on the
intensity of competition and welfare in two cases; when location decisions are taken
sequentially and when location decisions are taken simultaneously. We show that pro-
duction cost di¤erentials are crucial in determining the Nash equilibrium locations
(hence market shares) and the impact of the degree of privatization on the level of
downstream competition. Privatization leads to sti¤er competition when the mixed
ownership rm has the cost advantage. However, it can be welfare enhancing only
when decisions are taken sequentially with the follower being the semi-public rm hav-
ing a moderate production cost advantage over the market leader. The results of our
model generalize to capture the case of vertical mergers.
JEL classication: L13, L33, L42, R32
Keywords: mergers; mixed oligopoly; privatization; spatial competition
1 Introduction
De Fraja and Delbono (1989) initiated a large literature on mixed oligopoly, where public
and private rms coexist in the same market.1 The existing studies can be classied as falling
into two groups; one adopting a restricted binaryapproach where rms are either private or
public (e.g., Cremer et al., 1991; Matsumura and Matsushima, 2003; Lu, 2006; Heywood and
Ye, 2009a, b) and the other allowing for partially privatized rms (e.g., Matsumura, 1998;
Fershtman, 1990; Bennett and Maw, 2003; Kumar and Saha, 2008; Beladi et al., 2014).
Department of Economics, University of Piraeus, 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou Street, Piraeus 185 34, Greece.
E-mail: kostasel@otenet.gr (Eleftheriou); njm@unipi.gr (Michelacakis).
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1The industries where public and private rms coexist are numerous, and include, amongst others,
auto, steel, health, education, telecommunications etc. For a comprehensive review about mixed oligopoly
literature, see De Fraja (2009).
1
Mixed oligopoly, however, has rarely been examined within the context of spatial price
discrimination introduced by Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer (1937). This type of spa-
tial competition di¤ers from the one introduced by Hotelling (1929) in the fact that the rms
do not compete in mill prices but instead bear transportation costs and set delivered price
schedules.2 Few papers in mixed oligopoly theory account for spatial price discrimination.
Two such examples are the papers by Heywood and Ye (2009a, b) and Beladi et al. (2014).
These works, however, do not account for a vertical structure in the market3 and assume
that competing rms are homogeneous regarding their marginal production costs. A notable
exception is Beladi et al. (2016) but unfortunately this paper is plagued with conceptual
errors.
Our study is driven by the need to better understand the impact of the recent privatiza-
tion and merger waves4 on the strategic behavior of geographically di¤erentiated rms and
the ensuing welfare implications; a topic of profound interest for both academics and policy
makers. Regarding mergers, we focus our attention on vertical5 and upstream horizontal
mergers. The latter case is examined within the context of cross-border mergers6 driven by
trade liberalization.
The present work contributes to the existing literature in manifold ways. Firstly, it
adds to the limited number of studies on mixed oligopoly where retailers compete in a
vertically structured market exercising spatial price discrimination. Within this context, our
work complements a rather inconclusive literature on the welfare e¤ects of privatization.7
Secondly, it extends recent results to include and compare retailer location decisions under
simultaneous and sequential competition in a market exhibiting vertical structure. Thirdly,
2Applications of spatial price discrimination can be found in Lederer and Hurter (1986), Hamilton et
al. (1989), Hamilton et al. (1991), McLeod et al. (1992), Braid (2008), and Vogel (2011). Anderson et al.
(1992) present an overview of the related literature.
3The assumption of a vertically linked market enhances the validity of any policy implications since the
majority of the products are processed through the various stages of the vertical production chain before
reaching the nal consumer.
4For more information about the arguments for the existence of a seventh merger
wave, see https://meritocracycapital.com/another-merger-wave-unwinds/. Information about
privatization trends can be retrieved from the Privatization Barometer Report 2014/2015
(http://www.feem.it/userles/attach/2015112392244PB_Annual_Report_2014-2015.pdf).
5For a review on vertical mergers, see Lafontaine and Slade (2007).
6For a discussion about the signicance of cross-border mergers, see Chapman (2003).
7See Hamada (2017) for a brief review of the literature on welfare e¤ects of privatization.
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it establishes a general setting for the study of related problems enabling us to provide
concise and thorough explanations for the mistakes appeared in Beladi et al. (2010a) and
Beladi et al. (2010b) already announced in Eleftheriou et al. (2016a). Fourthly, it corrects
further mistakes pertaining in recent literature as in Beladi et al. (2016) setting the record
straight.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. When downstream rms take their
location decision simultaneously, their Nash equilibrium locations are determined by the
di¤erence in the marginal production costs (as expressed by the wholesale prices); the rm
having the cost advantage increases its market share. When location decisions are taken
sequentially, two e¤ects inuence the equilibrium outcome; the rst-mover e¤ect and the
cost-advantage e¤ect. A high cost producing rm can still increase its market share provided
it chooses its location rst and the cost advantage of its competitor is relatively small. In
other words, a downstream follower can still increase its market share provided it has a
sizeable cost advantage. An important policy-related implication of our analysis is that the
adaptability of a partially privatized public rm to changing market conditions (such as
changes in wholesale prices) increases with the degree of privatization. It is important to
observe that the results regarding the social optimality of the market outcome of a market
exhibiting a vertical structure are in sharp contrast with the corresponding results concerning
a market absent of vertical structure.
Our study further generates interesting results regarding the welfare implications of pri-
vatization. Specically, the welfare e¤ect of privatization depends on how the latter a¤ects
the balance between the rst-mover and the cost-advantage e¤ect. When no downstream
rival has a leading position (simultaneous move game) the cost-advantage e¤ect is enhanced
by privatization resulting to a lower welfare (despite the fact that privatization leads to sti¤er
competition when the mixed ownership rm has a cost advantage). In a sequential move
game, the balance between the two e¤ects depends on the nature of the leader. Privatization
is not e¢ cient when the semi-public rm is the leader. On the other hand, a public follower
exhibiting a cost advantage is a prime privatization target. Therefore, a vertical merger
between a public follower and a private upstream monopolist, which increases the degree of
privatization can be welfare enhancing.
3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model
where downstream rms decide on their locations simultaneously. The sequential move game
is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Simultaneous choice of location: The baseline model
The setting of our baseline model follows that of Beladi et al. (2016). Two downstream
rms, Ri, i = 1; 2, compete in a vertically related industry where the only input (interme-
diate good) required for downstream production is provided by an upstream supplier, M .
The intermediate good is transformed (on a one-to-one basis) by R1 and R2 into di¤erenti-
ated nal goods they sell to uniformly distributed consumers on a uni-dimensional (linear)
market interval with support on [0; 1]. The locations of R1 and R2 are denoted by x and y,
respectively, with x < y in [0; 1]. Three varieties of a di¤erentiated product are o¤ered: U
and W from rm R1 and V and W from rm R2. We assume that the fraction of consumers
buying only good U is equal to the fraction of consumers buying good V , both set equal to c
while a fraction b of consumers buys the common product W .8 Our assumptions about the
provision of downstream goods imply that R1 and R2 enjoy monopoly power over the goods
(or varieties) U and V while they compete for market share regarding the common good (or
variety) W . R1 is privately owned whereas R2 is partly privately owned and partly publicly
owned (mixed) in proportions a and 1 a, respectively with a 2 [0; 1]. The prot function of
R2 is equal to the weighted average of its own prots and social welfare with weights a and
1   a, respectively. Social welfare is equal to the sum of the aggregate prots (the prots
of both rms when they are both under private ownership) and consumerssurplus. Trans-
portation costs are equal to td, where t is a positive scalar and d is the distance shipped.
The maximum reservation price a consumer is willing to pay for any product is denoted by
k. This price is su¢ ciently large and becomes relevant only for products (or varieties) the
retailers enjoy monopoly power over. Downstream rms bear transportation costs. Their
marginal delivered cost for selling at location z is equal to the marginal production cost wi,
8If q denotes the fraction of consumers deciding to buy no good, then it is clear that b + 2c + q = 1.
Fractions b, c and q are constant throughout.
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i = 1; 2, plus the transportation cost for shipping the good to the consumers location z.
The pricing of downstream goods is as follows. For goods U and V , the downstream rms
taking advantage of their monopoly power charge all consumers innitesimally less than k.
Good W is the object of Bertrand competition à la Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer
(1937). Specically, the price charged for W by the rm that is closer to the consumer is
equal to (or innitesimally less than) the delivered cost of the rm that is further away.
Upstream supplier, downstream retailers and consumers play a four-stage game of com-
plete information. In the rst stage, M makes a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tari¤ o¤er
(wi; Fi), i = 1; 2, to rm Ri where wi is the wholesale price and Fi is the xed fee extracted
by the upstream supplier.9 At this stage, R1 and R2 simultaneously choose their locations in
the market. In stage two of the game, the downstream competitors, R1 and R2, simultane-
ously decide whether to accept or decline the two-part tari¤ contract o¤ered by the upstream
monopolist. Once an o¤er is accepted by the downstream rms, the xed fee is collected by
the monopolist. In the third stage, R1 and R2, having observed each others location, choose
delivered price schedules. In the nal stage of the game consumers make their purchasing
choices to clear the market. The solution of the game is given by backward induction.
In order to write down the prot functions of the downstream rms, we rst need to
determine the location of the indi¤erent consumer, s, for the common good W . To this end
we equate the respective delivered schedules to get t (y   s) + w2 = t (s  x) + w1 =) s =
x+y
2
+ w2 w1
2t
.
It should also be observed that if jw2 w1j
2t
> y x
2
, both rms are reduced to spatial-price
discriminating monopolists where the common good W is now provided only by either R1
or R2. We consider this case trivial and focus only on the case
jw2   w1j
2t
 y   x
2
: (1)
Thus, the prot functions of R1 and R2, are respectively:
9Vertically related rms usually trade through non-linear two-part tari¤ contracts (see Bonnet and
Dubois, 2010).
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R1(x; y) = c(k   w1) 
ct
2
[x2 + (1  x2)] +
Z x
0
b[t(y   x) + w2   w1]dz
+
Z (x+y2 +w2 w12t )
x
b[t(x+ y   2z) + w2   w1]dz   F1 (2)
R2(x; y) = c(k   w2) 
ct
2

y2 + (1  y)2+ Z y
(x+y2 +
w2 w1
2t )
b[t(2z   x  y) + w1   w2]dz
+
Z 1
y
b[t(y   x) + w1   w2]dz   F2 + (1  a)g(x; y) (3)
with
g(x; y) = R1(x; y)
+
0BB@
(x+y2 +
w2 w1
2t )Z
0
b[k   t(y   z)  w2]dz +
1Z
(x+y2 +
w2 w1
2t )
b[k   t(z   x)  w1]dz
1CCA
+
0BBB@ c
1R
0
w1dz + c
1R
0
w2dz + b
(x+y2 +
w2 w1
2t )R
0
w1dz + b
1R
(x+y2 +
w2 w1
2t )
w2dz
+F1 + F2
1CCCA (4)
The term inside the rst set of parentheses in (4) corresponds to the total consumer surplus
(CS), while the term inside the second set of parentheses denotes the prots of the upstream
monopolist (M). The objective of the mixed rm (R2) is to maximize the weighted average
of its own prots and social welfare, where the weights are determined by the degree of
privatization, a, i.e. R2(x; y) = aR2ja=1+(1 a)[R1 + R2 ja=1+CS+M ].10 Equations
(2) and (3) di¤er from the corresponding ones in Beladi et al. (2016) in three points. Firstly,
Beladi et al. (2016) (incorrectly) do not account for the fact that the delivered cost for good
10Where R2 ja=1 = c(k w2)  ct2

y2 + (1  y)2+R y
( x+y2 +
w2 w1
2t )
b[t(2z x y)+w1 w2]dz+
R 1
y
b[t(y 
x) + w1   w2]dz   F2.
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W of the rm that is located further away, which is equal to the price charged to consumers
by its rival rm, is equal to the sum of its transportation cost and its marginal cost (see
Braid, 2008, p. 345): Since the marginal cost of R2 is equal to the wholesale price, w2, the
prots of R1 realizing a sale of good W to a customer located at place z, will be equal to
w2+ t (y   z)  t jz   xj w1 = t (y   z)  t jz   xj+w2 w1. Secondly, Beladi et al. (2016)
fail to take into account the di¤erence of the two wholesale prices in determining the location
of the indi¤erent consumer which is correctly evaluated to x+y
2
+ w2 w1
2t
instead of x+y
2
as they
have. Thirdly, Beladi et al. (2016) do not include the prots of the upstream monopolist
(term inside the second set of parentheses in (4)) in the calculation of social welfare. Having
evaluated the integrals, (2) and (3) become
R1 (x; y) = c(k   w1) 
ct
2

x2 + (1  x)2
+bx [t (y   x) + w2   w1] + b
4t
[t (y   x) + w2   w1]2   F1 (2b)
R2(x; y) = c(k   w2) 
ct
2

y2 + (1  y)2+ b (1  y) [t (y   x) + w1   w2]
+
b
4t
[t (y   x) + w1   w2]2   F2 + (1  a)g(x; y) (3b)
R1 chooses x to maximize (2b), and R2 chooses y to maximize (3b), leading to the
following Nash equilibrium locations
(x; y) =

1
2
  r   [b(3 + a) + 4c]; 1
2
+ r   [b(1 + 3a) + 4ca]

(5)
where  = b(w1 w2)
8t(b+2c)(c+b)
and r = b
4(b+c)
.
We deduce,
Proposition 1. In a vertically related mixed downstream duopoly with simultaneous decision
taking, the Nash equilibrium locations of the two downstream rivals are
 
1
2
  r   [b(3 + a) + 4c]
for the privately owned rm and
 
1
2
+ r   [b(1 + 3a) + 4ca] for the mixed ownership rm.
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It can be shown that the socially optimal locations are equal to the ones determined by
Braid (2008), namely
(x; y) =

1
2
  r; 1
2
+ r

(6)
From Proposition 1 and (6), we get
Corollary 1. In a vertically structured market, where the downstream rivals decide on their
locations simultaneously
1. their Nash equilibrium locations are not socially optimal, unless both rms are privately
owned11
2. both rms move to the left (resp. right) of the socially optimal location if w1 > w2
(resp. w1 < w2)
3. an increase in the degree of privatization will induce both rms to move away from
their socially optimal locations, increasing (resp. decreasing) their in-between distance,
b
2(b+c)
+ (1 a)b(w1 w2)
4t(c+b)
, if w1 < w2 (resp. w1 > w2) and
4. total welfare decreases in the degree of privatization.
Proof. See Appendix.
Beladi et al. (2016) (in their Proposition I) arrive, indeed, at the same conclusion as in 1
of Corollary 1. However, they do so by a uke because the Nash equilibrium locations they
nd are independent from the di¤erence of wholesale prices (w1   w2) which, in general, is
not zero.
Eleftheriou and Michelacakis (2016b) have shown that in the absence of an upstream
supplier, the social optimality of Nash equilibrium locations is restored. When the market
exhibits a vertical structure it is the participation of the prots of the upstream supplier
that a¤ects the socially optimal location of the retail competitors.
11Eleftheriou and Michelacakis (2016a) showed that Nash equilibrium locations can be socially optimal
when both downstream rms are privately owned (i.e., a = 1).
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Part 2 of Corollary 1 implies that downstream competitors move towards the direction
of the rm producing with the higher wholesale price. The intuition behind this nding is
that the rm facing the higher wholesale price, loses its competitive edge and is forced to
give away part of its market share.
Part 3 of Corollary 1 is di¤erent than (and serves to correct) Propositions II and III
in Beladi et al. (2016). The intuition behind this statement appears counterintuitive al-
beit with strong policy implications; when the mixed ownership rm has a production cost
disadvantage (i.e., w1 < w2) then the intensity of competition decreases as the degree of
privatization increases. In other words, the nationalization of a costly partly public-partly
private rm is a desirable policy. While the adverse welfare e¤ect of privatization is reported
in the literature (see for example Sanjo, 2009; Heywood and Ye, 2009c; Martinez-Sanchez,
2011), it is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst time that this result manifests itself in a
model with heterogeneous costs without R&D, where the mixed ownership rm has the cost
disadvantage.
Through normalization if we let w1 = 0 (resp. w2 = 0) the model captures the case of a
vertical merger between the upstream monopolist and the private (resp. mixed ownership)
rm. We get the following corollary.12
Corollary 2. When the downstream private rm (R1) merges upstream, the Nash equilib-
rium locations of the two downstream rms, are

1
2
  r + [b(3 + a) + 4c] bw2
8t(b+2c)(c+b)

for the
integrated rm and

1
2
+ r + [b(1 + 3a) + 4ca] bw2
8t(b+2c)(c+b)

for the un-integrated rm. More-
over, both downstream rms move to the right of their socially optimal locations. Their
in-between distance, b
2(b+c)
  (1 a)bw2
4t(c+b)
, is an increasing function of the degree of privatization
and it is bounded above by the distance separating their socially optimal locations.
Assuming that a merger between R2 -with pre-merger private share a 2 [0; 1]- and the
upstream supplier leads to an integrated rm with private ownership share am with 0  a 
am  1, the following corollary is in line:
Corollary 3. When the downstream mixed ownership rm, R2, merges upstream, the Nash
equilibrium locations of the two downstream rms, are

1
2
  r   [b(3 + am) + 4c] bw18t(b+2c)(c+b)

12Setting a = 1 and w1 = 0, we get the results for the post-merger case in Eleftheriou and Michelacakis
(2016a).
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for the the un-integrated rm and

1
2
+ r   [b(1 + 3am) + 4cam] bw18t(b+2c)(c+b)

for the integrated
rm. Both downstream rms move to the left of their socially optimal locations. Their in-
between distance, b
2(b+c)
+ (1 am)bw1
4t(c+b)
, is a decreasing function of the degree of privatization
and it is bounded below by the distance separating their socially optimal locations.
The rationale behind the location choice of the downstream rivals in Corollaries 2 and 3
is the same as in Corollary 1; higher wholesale price goes hand in glovewith smaller market
share. A vertical merger in this case is equivalent to the maximization of the cost-advantage
for the integrated rm. The deviation of the in-between equilibrium distance from its socially
optimal level can be attributed to the fact that the welfare-oriented objective of R2 prevents
it from giving up (gaining) market share in favor of (against) R1, when the latter (former)
enjoys the competitive advantage of a lower wholesale price due to its merger with the input
supplier. The above result has an important policy implication; the degree of privatization
determines the responsiveness of the rm under mixed ownership to changes in production
cost conditions. The lower the a, the more sluggish the reaction of the mixed rm.
Both Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 can be extended to include the case of cross-border
horizontal mergers. For a = 1 (and w1 = w2), we get the results for the pre-merger au-
tarkic (pre-merger free trade and cross-border merger) case(s) announced in Eleftheriou et
al. (2016a) correcting the corresponding ones in Beladi et al. (2010b). An alternative
explanation following a case-specic treatment can be found in Eleftheriou et al. (2016b).
3 The sequential move game
In this section, we examine the case where the downstream rms decide on their locations
sequentially instead of simultaneously. The game is now played in six stages and at the end
of each stage all players have complete knowledge of the moves played in earlier stages. In
the rst stage, M makes a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tari¤ o¤er, (wi; Fi) to rm Ri in a
fashion similar to the simultaneous move game. In the second stage, Ri chooses its location
in the market. Having observed the location decision of Ri, Rj, j 6= i, chooses its location
in the third stage. In the fourth stage, R1 and R2 simultaneously decide whether or not to
accept or decline the two-part tari¤ contract o¤ered by the upstream monopolist, M . In
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stage ve of the game downstream rms engage in spatial price discrimination by choosing
delivered price schedules. In the nal stage, consumers make their purchasing choices to
clear the market.
The game is solved by backward induction. We rst examine the case where the privately
owned rm is the leader and the mixed ownership rm the follower. Maximizing (3) with
respect to y, we obtain R2s reaction function:
y(x) =
4t(b+ c) + 2tbx+ 2ba(w2   w1)
2t(4c+ 3b)
(7)
The prot function of R1 is
R1(x; y(x)) = c(k   w1) 
ct
2
[x2 + (1  x2)] +
Z x
0
b[t(y(x)  x) + w2   w1]dz
+
Z (x+y(x)2 +w2 w12t )
x
b[t(x+ y(x)  2z) + w2   w1]dz   F1 (8)
Solving the rst order condition for prot maximization of R1 and substituting the solu-
tion into (7), we get the following Nash equilibrium locations.
x =

1
2
  r

+
bfbt(3b+ 4c) + [12b2 + 16c2 + 28cb+ 4ba(b+ c)](w2   w1)g
4t(b+ c)
(9a)
y =

1
2
+ r

+
b[tb2 + (8b2a+ 24cba+ 4b2 + 4cb+ 16ac2)(w2   w1)]
4t(b+ c)
(9b)
where  = 16c2 + 20cb+ 5b2. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In a vertically related mixed downstream duopoly, the Nash equilibrium lo-
cations of the two downstream rms deciding on their locations sequentially with the privately
owned rm being the leader, are
 
1
2
  r+ bfbt(3b+4c)+[12b2+16c2+28cb+4ba(b+c)](w2 w1)g
4t(b+c)

for the
leader and
 
1
2
+ r

+ b[tb
2+(8b2a+24cba+4b2+4cb+16ac2)(w2 w1)]
4t(b+c)

for the follower.
Proposition 2 together with equation (6) lead to
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Corollary 4. When, in a vertically related mixed downstream duopoly, the downstream rms
decide on their locations sequentially with the privately owned rm being the leader then,
(i) if w1 > w2 andminf t(16c3+28c2b+15cb2+2b3)2b(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca) ; bt(8c
2+9cb+2b2)
(c+b)(b+4c)(ba+3b+4c)
g > w1 w2 > bt(4c+3b)4(c+b)(ba+3b+4c)
both downstream rms move away from their socially optimal locations, (x; y) = 
1
2
  r; 1
2
+ r

, to the direction of the downstream leader
(ii) if w1 > w2 and b
2t
4(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca)
< w1 w2 < bt(4c+3b)4(c+b)(ba+3b+4c) , R1(resp. R2) moves to the
direction of the downstream follower (resp. leader)
(iii) if w1 > w2 and w1   w2 < b2t4(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca) or if w1 < w2 both downstream rms move
to the direction of the downstream follower.
The interpretation of Corollary 4 is quite straightforward. A downstream rm can have
two competitive advantages; one from the rst-mover (leader) e¤ect and the other from
the cost e¤ect due to the lower wholesale price charged by the upstream supplier. When
w1 < w2, both e¤ects work concurrently in favor of R1. If, however, w1 > w2, the private
rm loses market share against the mixed ownership rm provided the di¤erence between the
wholesale prices is high enough (adverse cost e¤ect) to o¤set the rst-mover e¤ect. Finally,
if w1   w2 > 0 is within a certain interval ( b2t4(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca) ; bt(4c+3b)4(c+b)(ba+3b+4c)), then the adverse
cost e¤ect completely o¤sets the rst-mover e¤ect, intensifying competition and leading both
downstream rivals to move towards each other. A graphic illustration of Corollary 4 for the
case w1 > w2 is presented in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Further calculations using Proposition 2 lead to
Corollary 5. The in-between distance of the two downstream rms is b(8c
2+9cb+2b2)
(c+b)(16c2+20cb+5b2)
+
(w1   w2) b[b(2 a)+4c(1 a)](16c2+20cb+5b2)t . If both downstream rms operate on equal marginal costs privati-
zation does not a¤ect competition.
Corollary 5 conrms the crucial role of the cost advantage e¤ect in determining the impact of
privatization on the intensity of competition and consequently on the welfare (see Appendix).
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We observe that privatization a¤ects the intensity of competition and welfare only under the
existence of production cost di¤erences.
From Corollary 5 one deduces
Corollary 6. If the follower (R2) has a production cost advantage over the leader (R1), i.e.
if w1 > w2 then, the higher the degree of privatization the sti¤er the competition is because
their in-between distance is a decreasing function of the degree of privatization. If the leader
has a production cost advantage, i.e. if w1 < w2 then, the higher the degree of privatization
the weaker the competition is because their in-between distance is an increasing function of
the degree of privatization.
We arrive nally at the following corollary whose proof is explained in the Appendix.
Corollary 7. If w1 < w2 (resp. w1 > w2) total welfare decreases (resp. increases) as the
degree of privatization increases (resp. if b
2t
4(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca)
< w1   w2 < bt(4c+3b)4(c+b)(ba+3b+4c) or
w1   w2 < b2t4(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca)).
According to Corollary 6, a private leader with a cost handicap will su¤er more, in terms
of competition, from a private rather than a public follower. See, relatively, the discussion
about the responsiveness of the public rm to changes of the production cost in the previous
section. Corollary 7 implies that privatization will have a positive impact on total welfare
as long as the cost advantage of the mixed ownership rm is not very strong (i.e., cases (ii)
and (iii) as opposed to case (i) in Corollary 4). If w1 < w2, then R1 has both advantages
and an increase in the degree of privatization will decrease the competitive resistance of R2
(follower) leading to a lower level of total welfare and weaker competition.
Maximizing (2) with respect to x, we obtain R1s reaction function when the mixed rm
is the leader.
x(y) =
2t(by + 2c) + 2b(w2   w1)
2t(4c+ 3b)
(10)
The prot function of R2 in this case will become
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R2(x(y); y) = c(k   w2) 
ct
2

y2 + (1  y)2
+
Z y
(x(y)+y2 +
w2 w1
2t )
b[t(2z   x(y)  y) + w1   w2]dz
+
Z 1
y
b[t(y   x(y)) + w1   w2]dz   F2 + (1  a)g(x(y); y) (11)
Solving the rst order condition for prot maximization of R2 and plugging the solution into
(10), we get the following Nash equilibrium locations.
x =

1
2
  r

+
b[(16c2 + 24cb+ 4cba+ 4b2a+ 8b2)(w1   w2) + b2at]
4t(b+ c)( 6b2 + b2a  20cb  16c2) (12a)
y =

1
2
+ r

+
ba[(2b+ 2c)2(w1   w2) + (34b2t+ ctb)]
t( 6b3 + cb2a  16c3   26cb2   36bc2 + b3a) (12b)
We are led to
Proposition 3. In a vertically related mixed downstream duopoly, the Nash equilibrium
locations of the two downstream rms deciding on their locations sequentially with the mixed
ownership rm being the leader, are
 
1
2
+ r

+
ba[(2b+2c)2(w1 w2)+( 34 b2t+ctb)]
t( 6b3+cb2a 16c3 26cb2 36bc2+b3a)

for the leader
and
 
1
2
  r+ b[(16c2+24cb+4cba+4b2a+8b2)(w1 w2)+b2at]
4t(b+c)( 6b2+b2a 20cb 16c2)

for the follower.
Straightforward calculations using Proposition 3 and (6) lead to13
Corollary 8. In a vertically related market when the downstream competitors decide on their
locations sequentially with the mixed ownership rm being the leader, the following hold true:
(i) when w1 > w2, if a < 4c+2b4c+3b and w1   w2  t(b
2a 8c2+cba 10cb 3b2)
(c+b)(2b 3ba+4c 4ca) or if a >
4c+2b
4c+3b
and w1   w2   bt( 10cb 8c2+b2a+cba 3b2)2(b+c)(b+2c)(2b+ba+4c) , both downstream rms move away from their
socially optimal locations, (x; y) =
 
1
2
  r; 1
2
+ r

, to the direction of the downstream
follower
13In our analysis, the public rm remains the leader after privatization. This assumption is not unrealistic
(see Fjell and Heywood, 2002).
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(ii) when w1 < w2, if a > 4c+2b4c+3b and w2   w1  bt( 10cb 8c
2+b2a+cba 3b2)
4(b+c)2(ba 2b 4c) or if a <
4c+2b
4c+3b
and
w2   w1    t(b2a 8c2+cba 10cb 3b2)(c+b)(2b 3ba+4c 4ca) then
(iia) if w2   w1 > bt(3b+4c)16(c+b)2 both rms move to the direction of the downstream leader
(iib) if b
2at
4(c+b)(ba+2b+4c)
< w2 w1 < bt(3b+4c)16(c+b)2 , R1(resp. R2) moves to the direction of the
downstream leader (resp. follower)
(iic) if w2   w1 < b2at4(c+b)(ba+2b+4c) both rms move to the direction of the downstream
follower.14
The rationale behind Corollary 8 is the same as in Corollary 4; the interaction between
the rst-mover advantage e¤ect with the wholesale advantage e¤ect. The majority of the
technical conditions appearing in Corollary 8 aim at ensuring that 0  x < y  1 and (1)
hold (see proof in the Appendix).15 A graphic illustration of point (ii) in Corollary 8 is
presented in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
Proposition 3 allows us to calculate the distance between the Nash equilibrium locations of
the two rivals.
Corollary 9. The in-between distance of the downstream competitors is equal to b(b
2at+actb 8tc2 3b2t 10ctb)
t(c+b)( 6b2+b2a 20cb 16c2)+
(w1 w2) b[3b2a+7acb+4c2a 6cb 2b2 4c2]t(c+b)( 6b2+b2a 20cb 16c2) . Privatization a¤ects competition even if both downstream
rms operate on equal marginal costs (i.e., w1 = w2).
If the leader (R2) has a production cost advantage over the follower (R1), i.e. if w1 > w2
then, the higher the degree of privatization the sti¤er the competition is because their in-
between distance is a decreasing function of the degree of privatization. If the follower has a
production cost advantage, i.e. if w1 < w2 and if w2 w1 < bt(3b+4c)16(b+c)2 (resp. w2 w1 > bt(3b+4c)16(b+c)2 )
then, the higher the degree of privatization the sti¤er (resp. weaker) the competition is
14It can be shown that bt(3b+4c)16(c+b)2 is always less than
bt( 10cb 8c2+b2a+cba 3b2)
4(b+c)2(ba 2b 4c) and always less than
  t(b2a 8c2+cba 10cb 3b2)(c+b)(2b 3ba+4c 4ca) for a < 4c+2b4c+3b .
15Further details can be found in the Appendix under the title "Conditions for the validity of equilibrium
locations when the mixed ownership rm is the leader".
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because their in-between distance is an decreasing (resp. increasing) function of the degree
of privatization.16
Equation (A.3) in the Appendix has the following implication. When the semi-public
rm enjoys both advantages (rst-mover and cost), then an increase in a will make it more
aggressive (competitive), resulting to a decrease in the in-between distance of the downstream
rivals. However, if the leading position is combined with a cost handicap, the nal result
depends on the size of di¤erence between the production costs. If this is small, the rst-
mover advantage prevails increasing the aggressiveness of R2 as the degree of privatization
increases (i.e., the in-between distance will decrease in a).
Corollary 10. Total welfare decreases in the degree of privatization even if both downstream
rms operate on equal marginal costs (i.e., w1 = w2).
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Corollary 10, when the semi-public rm is the leader, an increase in pri-
vatization will always have a negative impact on total welfare, regardless of di¤erences in
production costs.
On equal production costs, an increase in a will increase competition since the rst-mover
advantage will be better exploited by the mixed ownership rm (i.e., the in-between distance
depends on a even if w1 = w2). Corollary 10 stresses the adage: Never privatize a public
leader". For a similar result, at the presence of government subsidies, when rms compete
in quantities see Fjell and Heywood (2004).
Propositions 2 and 3 and Corollaries 4-10 may be extended to include the case of a
vertical merger between the upstream supplier and the leader or the upstream supplier and
the follower of the market respectively. Specically, the corresponding results about the Nash
equilibrium locations as well as their in-between distance can be derived by setting wi = 0,
i = 1; 2, with i representing the integrated downstream rm and am with 0  a  am  1 as
the post-merger private share of the integrated rm. For a = 1, we get the results announced
in Eleftheriou et al. (2016a) correcting the corresponding ones in Beladi et al. (2010a). An
16Further details can be found in the Appendix under the title "Proof of the relationship between com-
petition intensity and privatization under R2 leadership".
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explanation following a case-specic treatment can be found in Eleftheriou and Michelacakis
(2016c).
To the end of shedding more light on the e¤ect of a on the competition in the case where
R2 is the leader, we consider the following example.
Example 1. Let c = 0, (i.e., no downstream rm has monopoly power and only the common
good W is provided). If R2 is completely public (i.e., a = 0) then the in-between distance
is 1
2
+ (w1   w2) 13t . If a = 1, i.e. R2 is completely private then the in-between distance is
2
5
  (w1   w2) 15t . Hence, if w1 = w2 or w1 > w2 or w2 > w1 with w2   w1 < 3t16 , then
competition is more intense when R2 is fully privatized. Furthermore, TW ja=0  TW ja=1 =
b[16(w1 w2)+3t]2
600t
> 0. If we further set w1 = 0 we capture the case of a vertical merger of
R1 with the upstream monopolist. Furthermore, the in-between distance following a vertical
merger between a fully public leader and the upstream monopolist leading to a semi-public
integrated rm with private share am is
(3 am)t (3am 2)w1
(6 am)t . It is observed that
(3 am)t (3am 2)w1
(6 am)t
decreases in am.
4 Conclusion
In the present paper, we examine the location behavior of two downstream rms in a verti-
cally linked market competing for market share within a frame of spatial price discrimination
using a single input supplied by an upstream monopolist. In the downstream market, we
allow for the coexistence of a private rm and a mixed ownership, private-public, rm of vari-
able degree of privatization. We assume that each retailer can provide only a fraction of the
product varieties demanded by consumers. Decisions are taken either simultaneously or se-
quentially. When decisions are taken simultaneously the production cost di¤erence between
retailers (due to di¤erent wholesale prices charged by the upstream supplier) is identied as
the driving force of our ndings. Results along this line of research have been obtained by
Beladi et al. (2010b) and Beladi et al. (2016). We set the record straight as these papers
are all plagued by similar mistakes and misconceptions.
We further contribute to the literature by considering a sequential decision game. It turns
out that a high enough marginal production cost advantage for the downstream follower can
17
more than o¤set the rst-mover advantage of the leader leading the latter to lose part of
her market share. We show that privatization of public rms increases their adaptability
to changes in their marginal production cost. Nevertheless, when the mixed ownership rm
is the market follower enjoying a marginal production cost advantage privatization leads to
more intense competition and increased total welfare only when this advantage is of moderate
size. Contrary to common belief, we prove that privatizing a public leader is not a benecial
move.
Our ndings have implications for mixed oligopolistic markets and markets where vertical
mergers are taking place. In addition, they provide theoretical answers to pertinent economic
policy questions regarding the feasibility of privatization of public rms.
Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1
Parts 1, 2 and 3 are derived from Proposition 1 and (6). Substituting (5) into total
welfare TW = R1 + R2ja=1 + CS +M and di¤erentiating with respect to a, we get
@TW
@a
=
 b2(w1   w2)2(3ba+ b+ 4ca)
16t(b+ c)(b+ 2c)
< 0 (A.1)
which proves part 4. Finally, equilibrium locations satisfy 0  x < y  1 and (1) if (i)
w1   w2  2bt3b+4c+ba when w1 > w2 and (ii) w2   w1  2bt5b+4c ba when w1 < w2.
Proof of Corollary 7
Substituting (9a) and (9b) into the total welfare (TW ) and di¤erentiating with respect
to a, we get
@TW
@a
=  (w1   w2)[(w1   w2)L1   L2] (A.2)
with L1 =
(4b3+32ac3+12cb2+ 11
2
b3a+56bac2+8c2b+30cb2a)b2
(16c2+20cb+5b2)2t
and L2 =
(tb3+2tcb2)b2
(16c2+20cb+5b2)2t
.
If w1 > w2, then @TW@a > 0 if w1   w2 < L2L1 =
2b2t(b+2c)
8b3+64ac3+24cb2+11b3a+112bac2+16c2b+60cb2a
.
However, it can be shown that this always holds for cases (ii) and (iii) in Corollary 4 (i.e.,
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the di¤erence between the wholesale prices should not be very high). For case (i) in Corollary
4, @TW
@a
< 0. Moreover, if w1 < w2, then @TW@a < 0.
Conditions for the validity of equilibrium locations when the private firm
is the leader
Equilibrium locations satisfy 0  x < y  1 and (1) if
(i) w1   w2  minf t(16c3+28c2b+15cb2+2b3)2b(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca) ; bt(8c
2+9cb+2b2)
(c+b)(b+4c)(ba+3b+4c)
g when w1 > w2 and (ii) w2  
w1  minf t(8c2+9cb+2b2)(c+b)[b(2 a)+4c(1 a)] ; t(16c
3+28c2b+15cb2+2b3)
2b(c+b)(b+2ba+4ca)
; bt(8c
2+9cb+2b2)
(b+c)(7b2+24cb+16c2 4cba ba2)g when w1 < w2.
Proof of the relationship between competition intensity and privatization
under R2 leadership
We di¤erentiate the in-between distance provided in Corollary 9 with respect to a to get
 (w1   w2)

b(b+ 2c)2(16b2 + 32cb+ 16c2)
t(b+ c)( 6b2 + b2a  20cb  16c2)2

  b(b+ 2c)
2(3b2t+ 4ctb)
t(b+ c)( 6b2 + b2a  20cb  16c2)2
(A.3)
It can be easily shown that A.3 is always negative if w1 > w2 or if w1 < w2 with w2 w1 <
bt(3b+4c)
16(b+c)2
(cases (iib) and (iic) in Corollary 8). If w1 < w2 with w2   w1 > bt(3b+4c)16(b+c)2 then A.3
is always positive (case (iia) in Corollary 8).
Proof of Corollary 10
The derivative of the total welfare with respect to the degree of privatization is
@TW
@a
=
b2a(b+ 2c)2[(w1   w2)(32cb+ 16b2 + 16c2) + 3b2t+ 4ctb]2
2t(b+ c)( 6b2 + b2a  20cb  16c2)3 < 0 (A.4)
Conditions for the validity of equilibrium locations when the mixed own-
ership firm is the leader
Equilibrium locations satisfy 0  x < y  1 and (1) if (i) w1 w2  t(b2a 8c2+cba 10cb 3b2)(c+b)(2b 3ba+4c 4ca)
for a < 4c+2b
4c+3b
or w1   w2   bt( 10cb 8c2+b2a+cba 3b2)2(b+c)(b+2c)(2b+ba+4c) for a > 4c+2b4c+3b , when w1 > w2 and
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(ii) w2   w1  bt( 10cb 8c2+b2a+cba 3b2)4(b+c)2(ba 2b 4c) for a > 4c+2b4c+3b or w2   w1    t(b
2a 8c2+cba 10cb 3b2)
(c+b)(2b 3ba+4c 4ca) for
a < 4c+2b
4c+3b
, when w1 < w2.
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 Figure 1: Graphic illustration of Corollary 4 for the case w1 > w2 
 
Note: Ri and Ri
’
 denote the socially optimal and the Nash equilibrium location of firm i, respectively. 
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Figure 2: Graphic illustration of point (ii) in Corollary 8 
 
Note: Ri and Ri
’
 denote the socially optimal and the Nash equilibrium location of firm i, respectively. 
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